Abstract. We study the supply chain (SC) returning strategy and quantity discount coordination under the condition of product quality defects. We assume that the demand is a triangular fuzzy number (TFN), considering the SC coordination problem consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The decentralized SC coordination model and the integrated SC coordination model under a fuzzy environment are established respectively. The fuzzy set theory is used to study the manufacturer's quantity discount and the retailer's coordination of return policy. The signed distance is used as the ranking method to find the optimal order quantity in SC, and the optimization theory is used to maximize the participants' profits. We first demonstrate that the retailer's profit will be reduced in a typical integrated channel, and then we propose a quantitative discount return policy to coordinate the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Finally, the coordination steps are designed, and the manufacturer's return policy is given. Meanwhile, some illustrative cases are provided to illustrate the feasibility of the proposed model.
Introduction
Some scholars and practitioners have focused on coordinating prices and order quantities between manufacturers and the retailers in supply chain management (SCM) . "Each company in a supply chain (SC) must perform a precise set of actions to achieve optimal SC performance. However, the main goal of each company is its own profit. Therefore, a superior SC needs to coordinate different incentive mechanisms" (Cachon, 2003) . Return policy (Emmons & Gibert, 1998) , revenue sharing (Cachon & Lariviere, 2000) , and quantity discounts (Dolan, 1987) are common tools for coordinating conflicts between manufacturers and the retailers. In quantity discounts, and the buyer can influence its suppliers. Sana (2011) proposed an integrated production inventory model for defective quality items in a three-tier SC. Rad, Khoshalhan, and Glock (2014) developed a supplier-purchaser integrated SC model whose production was imperfect. Taleizadeh, Noori-daryan, and Tavakkoli-Moghaddam (2015) proposed an economic production and inventory model in the SC, in which the products quality was incomplete and the inspections were performed when the defective products were repurchases. Pal, Mahapatra, and Samanta (2016) developed a joint EPQ model for products with random demand and defective quality.
There are few papers on SC coordination of imperfect quality products using FST. Yu and Jin (2011) studied the return strategy model with demand ambiguity and information asymmetry. Zheng, Liu, and Wang (2010) proposed two fuzzy models for poor quality newsboy problem in decentralized and centralized systems. Hu et al. (2010) established a fuzzy stochastic inventory model, whose production processes were incomplete and time was random. Manna, Dey, and Mondal (2014) in the fuzzy rough environment considered the product reliability and the transformation of defective products in the three-layer SC, then an imperfect production inventory model was developed. Kurdhi, Lestari, and Susanti (2015) proposed a fuzzy collaborative SC inventory model in which controllable setup cost and service level for defective products were constrained. Kumar, Tiwari, and Goswami (2016) developed a two-level comprehensive procurement production model for the SC under fuzzy stochastic framework.
We use FST to study the return strategy with quantity discount in SC coordination. We first show that the retailer's profit will decrease within the typical integrated channel. Then, based on the optimal order quantity (OQ) within the integrated channel, we propose a return policy with quantity discount to coordinate the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Finally, we employ the optimization theory to maximize the profits of participants and give cases to exemplify the feasibility of the model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 introduces some fuzzy operations and fuzzy representations. Section 2 introduces some assumptions and notations. Section 3 proposes a coordination mechanism with return policy and quantity discount. In Section 4, some numerical cases are provided to exemplify our model. The paper ends with some conclusions in last section. Zadeh's (1965) FST has a wide range of application in the management field, such as inventory management, supply planning and supplier elections, and has proven to be a suitable means of model uncertainty. In what follows, we give a simple introduction to some wellknown fuzzy operations and the decomposition principle.
Preliminaries
Definition 1 (Zimmermann, 2011) 
 is called an a-level fuzzy point. Definition 2 (Zimmermann, 2011) . Let the FN , , 
then A  is called a triangular fuzzy number (TFN).
Definition 3 (Yao & Wu, 2000) .
 , is called an a-level fuzzy interval. Definition 4 (Zimmermann, 2011) . Let B  be a FN on ( , ) R = −∞ ∞ , and 0 1 ≤ a ≤ , then
Extension Principle (Zimmermann, 2011) . Let B  be a FN on ( , ) R = −∞ ∞ and 0 1 ≤ a ≤ .
Suppose that the
where (I) ( ) B a a is a FN with the MF:
.
From the principle of extension, we obtain ( ) ( ) ( )
From Yao and Wu (2000) , we introduce the concept of signed distance of FNs:
Definition 5 (Yao & Wu, 2000) . For any a and 0 R ∈ , ( ) ,0 a a ϑ = is defined as the signed distance from a to 0. If a > 0, then the distance from a to 0 is 
, there is a one-to-one mapping between the a-fuzzy interval
 is a mapping to the real number 0, and hence, the signed distance of
Since the above function is continuous on 0 1 ≤ a ≤ , then, we have the following definition:
Definition 6 (Yao and Wu, 2000) . For B ∈Ω  , the signed distance of B  to 1 0  is defined as:
Notations
We first introduce some basic notations which are useful in the remainder of the paper: q − q , then the inventory is sufficient, an amount of (1 ) q x − q − will be left, and the total profit of the retailer will be
q − q , then the inventory is insufficient by an amount of (1 ) x q − − q , the total profit of the retailer will be (
px s x q W q − − − q − − q for a given q with q defective rate, and the total profit of the retailer will depend on the demand x:
The MF of the fuzzy profit ( ) r x q π  is the same with that of the demand x (Kao & Hsu, 2002; Chen & Ho, 2011 ). Here we assume that the uncertain demand D  is expressed as a TFN (Dubois & Prade, 1987) (Figure 1 ). Due to the lack of historical information, the demand for products is usually inaccurate, and the retailer can expect: "the demand for this season will is likely to be d units, not less than 1 d − σ and no more than
The uncertain demand can be described as the following MF:
Models
We take into account a return policy for quantity discount between a manufacturer and a retailer in a two-echelon SC with imperfect quality. The manufacturer forecasts the uncertain demand D  in a TFN and designs a return policy with quantity discount contract to the retailer. Then the manufacturer supplies the products with imperfect quality to the retailer and the retailer determines q and the products are not examined with q defective rate to the customer. The imperfect products are returned to the retailer, and then to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer designs a return price p with the quantity discount l to give an incentive to the retailer ( Figure 2 ).
We first model the decentralized SC channel to solve the optimal * q . Then we establish the integrated SC channel to calculate the optimal ** q , and demonstrate that the retailer's profit decreases with the integrated channel. In this case, the manufacturer supplies the return policy with quantity discount to give an incentive to the retailer. 
The decentralized channel
Here we give several basic expressions, where the retailer orders products and the manufacturer provides products in a decentralized channel:
1) The retailer's profit is the differences of the sales volume, the shortage cost, the holding cost, and the purchasing cost: the demand is subjectively believed to be a normal FN D  .
2) The manufacturer's profit is the difference of the purchasing volume and the manufacturing cost:
To obtain the retailer's optimal OQ, we use Eq. (10) to express the retailer's fuzzy profit ( ) r ϑ π  . By analyzing the characteristics of the function, the optimal OQ is given. Due to that the MF of the demand D  is expressed with ( ) l x and ( ) r x , in what follows, we discuss the MF of ( ) r q π  from two cases
− q < , then using then the extension principle , the demand D  's MF is ( ) l x , the retailer's fuzzy profit also has the same MF with the demand. The a-level sets of fuzzy sales volume, the fuzzy holding quantity and the fuzzy shortage quantity under the decentralized channel can be derived as follows :
where 0
, and according to Eqs. (10), (12) and (14)- (16), we get the retailer's expected profit (EP):
Simplifying Eq. (17) with the integral method, we obtain the retailer's profit:
In order to get the retailer's optimal OQ, we can calculate the first-order partial derivative and the second order partial derivative ( ( )) r q ϑ π  with respect to q:
Since the second-order partial derivative ( ( )) r q ϑ π  with respect to q is smaller than 0, then the retailer's profit reaches maximum when the first-order partial derivative equals zero, and the optimal OQ is:
, then similar to Case 1, and using the extension principle, the demand D  's MF is ( ) r x , so texhe retailer's fuzzy profit also has the same MF with the demand D  . Then we have: (12), (22), (23) and (24), we get the retailer's EP:
Additionally, simplifying Eq. (25) with the integral method, then we have:
After that, similar to Case 1, we have:
The retailer's profit reaches maximum when the first-order partial derivative equals zero, and the optimal OQ is:
Consequently, by Eqs. (21) and (29), we get the optimal OQ in a decentralized channel:
The integrated channel
Considering an integrated channel where a manufacturer and a retailer work together as a company. They make decisions of their OQ to maximize the profits of the entire SC. First, we represent the fuzzy profit of the total SC, and then defuzzify the profit and calculate the OQ using the optimization theory. We compare the OQ, the EP of the manufacturer and the retailer with different channels, and demonstrate that the OQ, the total SC's EP and the manufacturer's EP increase with the integrated channel, but the retailer's EP decreases with the integrated channel.
The total profit of SC in an integrated channel is:
Similar to Section 4.1, we use Eq. (31) to express the fuzzy total profit of the SC with the integrated channel, and discuss the following two cases: 
Then we get the total profit: 
Since the second-order partial derivative ( ( )) r q ϑ π  with respect to q is smaller than 0, then the retailer's profit reaches maximum when the first-order partial derivative equals zero, and the optimal OQ is: (1 ) ( 1) ) 0.5
We can further solve the OQ with the integrated channel:
Consequently, by Eqs (36) and (38), the optimal OQ with the integrated channel can be written as:
T d p s c p s h c p s h p h s q d h c p s h c p h s p h s
Comparing two different channels of OQ (i.e., the decentralized channel and the integrated channel), we can get the following propositions: Proposition 1. The optimal OQ of the integrated channel is higher than the optimal OQ of the decentralized channel. 
and the optimal OQ with the integrated channel is:
Also since
< , and the optimal OQ with the integrated channel is greater than that with the decentralized channel.
Proposition 2. The EP of the entire SC and the manufacturer are higher in the integrated channel than in the decentralized channel. r T rϑ π < ϑ π   . According to Propositions 1-3, the retailer's profit decreases with the typical integrated channel, so the manufacturer has to supply some mechanisms to give an incentive to the retailer, and thus in the next subsection, we shall propose a return policy with OQ to coordinate the supply relationship.
Proof. For the EP of entire SC ( )

Coordination mechanism with the integrated channel
In order to give an incentive to the retailer to order the products with the quantity ** T q , the manufacturer supplies the return price R and the quantity discount rate l for the retailer. Then we have:
and the manufacturer' profit can be written as:
In our study, we assume that the manufacturer promises the retailer a e percent discount on the profit, to guarantee the win-win condition, then e satisfies the following condition (t is the maximum increasing rate for the retailer):
and the retailer's EP can be expressed as:
So the return price and the discount rate ( ) ,R l should satisfy the following:
In order to obtain (l, R), we need to consider the decentralized channel and the integrated channel, and then similar to Section 4.2, the following three cases should be discussed: (18), (40), (41), (49) and (50), and transform the return price and the discount rate (l, R) as:
(1 ) (26), (44), (45), (49) and (50), and transform the return price and the discount rate (l, R) as:
The manufacturer and the retailer first judge which case in the above comes up to the actual environment, they negotiate so as to get a rational value of e, and then determine a satisfied set of (l, R) from Eq. (51), (52) or (53).
Steps for SC coordination process
From the above propositions, we get the following steps for the SC coordination with quantity discount and buyback policy.
Step 1. With the uncertain demand, defective rate, costs, wholesale price and sale price, we calculate the retailer's OQ with different channels * q and ** T q , the retailer's EP with decentralized channel Step 2. Calculate the maximum growth rate t for the retailer with Eq. (48).
Step 3. The manufacturer and the retailer coordinate an appropriately value of e (0 < e ≤ t) for the integrated channel.
Step 4. Based on the values of costs, price and the defective rate, judge which case is in three cases, then determine a satisfied set of (l, R) from Eq. (51), (52) 
Numerical examples
To illustrate the proposed solution procedure, in the following, we investigate three cases with the different values of the parameters. S is a new product from the manufacturer M with imperfect quality, N is a downstream retailer, owing to the lack of statically data, the demand is uncertain, and the retailer N forecasts the demand with TFN.
Let's assume the uncertain demand:
[800, 1000, 1150], D =  the defective rate: q = 0.08, the retailer N's holding cost: h = 12, the shortage cost: s = 8, the manufacturer M's cost: c = 12, and the wholesale price from M to N: W d = 20. In the case where the sale price is [20, 50] p ∈ , the optimal order quantities with the decentralized channel and the integrated channel are shown in Figure 3 .
As can be seen from Figure 3 , the OQ of integrated channel is always higher than that of decentralized channel. When p s h W + − − = − < , the retailer N's OQ increases from 995 to 1062, the total SC's profit increases from 9619 to 9835, the manufacturer M's profit increases from 6368 to 6797, but the retailer N's EP decreases from 3251 to 3038. These changes can be seen in Table 1 . The typical integrated channel could not stimulate the retailer to increase the OQ. In order to guarantee the win-win condition, according to Eq. (40), the increase rate e of the retailer N should be smaller than (9833 -9619)/3251 = 6.58%, we discuss four different values of e: i.e., 0, 1%, 3.3% and 6.58%, respectively. The results obtained are shown in Table 2 . Table 2 . Quantity discount with return policy in Case 1 From Table 2 , we can see the total SC profit is optimal with the different values of (l, R), and the retailer's EP and the manufacturer's EP also increase. Table 3 . Channel's EPIn order to guarantee the win-win condition, according to Eq. (40), the increase rate e of the retailer N should be smaller than (29043-28713)/21740 = 1.52%, we discuss five different values of e: i.e., 0, 0.76%, 1%, and 1.52%, respectively. The results obtained are shown in Table 4 .
From Table 4 , we can see the total SC profit is optimal with the different values of (l, R), and the retailer's EP and the manufacturer's EP also increase. Table 4 . Quantity discount with return policy in Case 2 Table 5 ). Channel 's EP 19149 19320 In order to guarantee the win-win condition, according to Eq. (40), the increase rate e of the retailer N should be smaller than /12420 = 1.38%, we discuss five different values of e: i.e., 0, 1%, 1.38%, respectively. The results obtained are shown in Table 6 . From Table 6 , we can see the total SC profit is optimal with different values of (l, R), and the EP of the retailer and the manufacturer will also increase.
Conclusions
We explored the SC consisting of a producer and a retailer. Consider that the manufacturer's products have a certain degree of quality defects, and the manufacturer provides a quantity discount return police. A fuzzy planning model for decentralized SC and integrated SC was constructed. Using the fuzzy programming theory method based on probability distribution to solve the proposed models, the research shows that:
1) The optimal OQ of the integrated channel is higher than the optimal OQ of the decentralized channel.
2) The EPs of the entire SC and the manufacturer are higher in the integrated channel than those in the decentralized channel.
3) The retailer's EP is lower than that of the decentralized channel under integrated channel. The main contribution is to develop a SC return policy model with product quality defects and quantity discounts, which is based on the possibility fuzzy optimization algorithm. According to a typical integrated channel, the retailer's EP will decrease compared to the decentralized channel, and both parties can not agree to the contract. To solve this issue, we proposed a return policy with quantity discount to coordinate the relationship between the supplier and retailer. The corresponding coordination steps were also given. Furthermore, we adopted the optimization theory to maximize the participants' profits and provided some numerical examples to illustrate the optimal solutions. This paper only considered the combination contract of quantity discount and return of the two-echelon SC under the uncertainty of demand. In management practices, more and more companies need to consider the operations of multinational SCs. In contrast to a county's domestic SC, the multinational SC must also consider the impact of international finance, international trade, and other factors on the contractual parameters in the formulation of contracts. In addition, the three-echelon SC is also a common form of SC in reality. Coordinating the three-echelon SC will be more difficult than coordinating the two-echelon SC, and the research will be more complicated. Therefore, in the future, we will study the threeechelon SC and the form of portfolio contract under the multinational corporation's SC.
